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This paper provides a security proof of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution
protocol in practical implementation. To prove the security, it is not assumed that defects in the
devices are absorbed into an adversary’s attack. In fact, the only assumption in the proof is that
the source is characterized. The proof is performed by lower-bounding adversary’s Re´nyi entropy
about the key before privacy amplification. The bound reveals the leading factors reducing the key
generation rate.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 89.70.+c, 02.50.-r
One of the fundamental problems in cryptography is
to provide a way of sharing a secret random number be-
tween two parties, Alice and Bob, in the presence of an
adversary Eve. The quantum key distribution is a so-
lution to this problem[1, 2]; indeed it allows Alice and
Bob to generate a shared secret key securely against Eve
with unbounded resources of computation. The security
of quantum key distribution against general attacks was
first proved by Mayers[10]. Later, Shor-Preskill[11] pro-
vided a simple security proof based on the observation
that quantum key distribution (BB84 protocol) is closely
related to quantum error-correcting codes (CSS codes).
Gottesmann et al.[6] showed that the Shor-Preskill proof
is still valid as long as the source and detector are perfect
enough so that all defects can be absorbed into Eve’s at-
tack (see also [7, 12] for the rate achievability of quantum
codes in the security proof). In contrast to the security
proof based on quantum codes, the Mayers proof has a
remarkable characteristics. Namely in the Mayers proof,
although the source has to be (almost) perfect, there is
no restriction on the detector; in particular, it can be un-
characterized. By exchanging the role of the source and
detector in the Mayers proof, Koashi-Preskill[9] provided
a security proof which applies to the case where the de-
tector is perfect, but the source can be uncharacterized
(except that the averaged states are independent of Al-
ice’s basis). The aim of this work is to generalize these
results. We provide a security proof of the BB84 protocol
in which the only assumption is that the source is char-
acterized. In the same way as Koashi-Preskill[9], this can
be transformed into a security proof which is based on
characteristics of the detector. Further we note that the
security proof also applies to the B92 protocol[1].
Let us first recall the BB84 protocol[2]. Let H be a
Hilbert space. Let A = {1, · · · , N}, and for B ⊂ A
denote the cardinality of B by nB. The BB84 protocol is
described as follows.
BB84 protocol: (i) Alice generates two binary strings
aA = {ai}i∈A and xA = {xi}i∈A according to the
probability distribution p(aA, xA) =
∏
i pai,xi . (ii) Bob
generates a binary string bA = {bi}i∈A according to
the probability distribution p(bA) =
∏
i pbi . (iii) Alice
sends the quantum state on H⊗N , ρAa,x =
⊗
i∈A ρai,xi ,
to Bob. (iv) Bob applies the measurement on H⊗N ,
{EAb,y}yA =
{⊗
i∈A Ebi,yi
}
yA∈{0,1,φ}N
, to the received
quantum state, where E0,φ = E1,φ is the measurement
corresponding to the result that Bob cannot detect a
state. (v) Alice and Bob open aA and bA respectively.
Let D = {i ∈ A|yi 6= φ} and C = {i ∈ D|ai = bi}. Al-
ice and Bob select a random subset T ⊂ C (which does
not necessarily satisfy nT /nC ∼ 1/2). Let K = C − T .
(vi) Alice and Bob compare xT and yT , and count the
number of errors, neT = |{i ∈ T |xi 6= yi}|. (vii) Bob
estimates xK by exchanging error-correction information
with Alice. (viii) Alice and Bob generate a secret key s
by applying a compression function to xK.
To prove the security of the BB84 protocol, the previ-
ous works[6, 9, 10, 11] assume that either Alice’s source
or Bob’s detector is almost perfect in the sense that all
defects in the device can be absorbed into Eve’s attack.
We wish to prove the security of quantum key distribu-
tion under practical implementation. Note that the pre-
vious security proofs have been based on directly bound-
ing Eve’s mutual information about the final key, i.e. the
key after privacy amplification. In this work, we first
lower-bound Eve’s Re´nyi entropy about the key before
privacy amplification, and then apply privacy amplifica-
tion in the classical information theory which makes use
of a compression function in a universal hash family (see
[3] for the classical theory of privacy amplification).
We now provide basic definitions which will be used
later (see e.g. [8] for details). The variation distance
between probability distributions p and q is given by
dV (p, q) =
1
2
∑
ω |p(ω) − q(ω)|. The quantum analogue
of the variation distance is called the trace distance. For
an Hermitian operator X with the spectrum decompo-
sition X =
∑
i xiEi, define the projection {X > 0} by
{X > 0} = ∑i:xi>0Ei. Then the trace distance be-
tween quantum states ρ and σ, dT (ρ, σ), is given by
dT (ρ, σ) =
1
2Tr |∆| = 12Tr(∆{∆ > 0}−∆{−∆ > 0}) with
∆ = ρ−σ. The trace distance can be bounded by another
distance called the fidelity as dT (ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2,
where the fidelity F (ρ, σ) between ρ and σ is given by
F (ρ, σ) = Tr |√ρ√σ|.
Let z be the output of the measurement by Eve. Then,
without loss of generality, the probability distribution of
2the random variables can be written as
pCa(x, y, z) ≡ p(xC , yC , z|aA, bA, xT , yT ,D, T )
= pCa(x)Tr(E
C
a,y ⊗ Ez)U(ρCa,x ⊗ ρE)U †.
Here, ρE is the initial state of an ancilla system HE in-
troduced by Eve, Ez is the Eve’s measurement on the
ancilla system, and U is the Eve’s unitary operation act-
ing on the composite system. (The quantum channel is
assumed to be under Eve’s control). For B ⊂ C and pa
as above, let pBa denote the marginal distribution of the
random variables defined on B.
We begin with decomposing ρα (a, x ∈ {0, 1}) as
ρa,x = p
(0)
a,xρ
(0)
a,x + p
(1)
a,xρ
(1)
a,x, ρ
(0)
a,x, ρ
(1)
a,x ∈ S(H), (1)
where p
(0)
a,x + p
(1)
a,x = 1, pa,xp
(0)
a,x = p(0) for a positive con-
stant p(0) ≤ mina,x{pa,x}, and ρ(0)a,x has a Schatten de-
composition of the form
ρ(0)a,x =
∑
ka,x
λa,x(ka,x)|ka,x〉〈ka,x|. (2)
We note that ρa,x always has a decomposition of the
above form (where we allow ρ
(0)
a,x = ρ
(1)
a,x). Let X =
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. We now construct a set of
pure states, {ρˆα}α∈X , such that there exists a physi-
cal transformation from {ρˆα}α∈X to {ρ(0)α }α∈X . Let µαβ
(α, β ∈ X ) be a mapping from {|kα〉}kα to {|kβ〉}kβ with
µαα being the identity on {|kα〉}kα , and introduce the
Gram matrix G by writing
[G]αβ =
∑
kα
√
λα(kα)λβ(kαβ)〈kα|kαβ〉〈φkα |φkαβ 〉,
where |kαβ〉 = µαβ(|kα〉) and |φkα〉 is a state on an ancilla
system Hφ. Since G ≥ 0, there exists a square matrix
C such that G = C†C. Further, since all the diagonal
elements ofG are 1, we can define a pure state ρˆα (α ∈ X )
on a 4-dimensional Hilbert space H4 by
ρˆα = |Cα〉〈Cα|,
where Cα denotes the α-th column of C. It follows from
this construction that there exists a physical transfor-
mation from {ρˆα}α∈X to {ρ(0)α }α∈X (see [4]). Now we
introduce an approximation of {ρˆα}α∈X which is easier
to treat in the security proof. Let H2 be a 2-dimensional
subspace of H4, and σa,x (a, x ∈ {0, 1}) be states on H2
such that
σ0,0 + σ0,1 = σ1,0 + σ1,1 = IH2 ,
where, for a Hilbert space H, IH denotes the identity
on H. Note that the decompositions (1) and (2) and
the choises of µαβ , |φkα〉 and σa,x are not unique; they
should be determined so that the distance dT (σa,x, ρˆa,x)
will be minimized. In the case of coherent states with no
phase reference, ρα =
∑
k∈N(µ
k/k!)e−µ|k;α〉〈k;α|, for
instance, we can take for α, β ∈ X and k ∈ N, ρ(0)α =
ρˆα = σα = |1;α〉〈1;α|, p(0)α = µe−µ, µαβ(|k;α〉) = |k;β〉
and |φk;α〉 = |φ〉.
The decomposition (1) allows us to consider that the
Alice’s source generates ρ
(0)
a,x with probability p
(0)
a,x and
ρ
(1)
a,x with probability p
(1)
a,x. Further, we assume that Eve is
informed of partial information about each state ρA gen-
erated by the Alice’s source: (i) ρA = ρ
(0)
a,x or ρA = ρ
(1)
a,x
and (ii) ρA = ρ
(1)
0,x or ρA = ρ
(1)
1,x when ρA = ρ
(1)
a,x. This
assumption is advantageous to Eve, and hence does not
reduce the security of the protocol. Let L ⊂ K be the po-
sitions where ρ
(0)
a,x is generated, andM = K−L. We now
fix L and M, and consider the best success probability
to estimate xM from ρ
(1)M
a,x and aM. Here note that we
can estimate each bit xi of x
M separately because each
state ρai,xi is generated independently of the other bits
{xi′ |i′ 6= i, i′ ∈ M}. For a ∈ {0, 1}, let {Ta,0, Ta,1, Ta,φ}
be a POVM on H which is used to discriminate ρ(1)a,0 and
ρ
(1)
a,1, and let p
(1)
a be the conditional probability defined by
p
(1)
a = (pa,0p
(1)
a,0 + pa,1p
(1)
a,1)/(pa,0 + pa,1). Further, define
for a constant δaM > 0,
pa− = (p
a
M − δaM)
naD
naKp
(1)
a
, paM =
naM
naA
,
ǫaM = exp(−naAD(B1(paM)||B1(paM − δaM))),
where ndB = |{i ∈ B|ai = d}| for B ⊂ A, B1 denotes the
Bernoulli distribution, and D(p||q) is the relative entropy
of p and q[13]. Here let us consider the condition C given
by
C :
∑
x,x′
Tr pˆ(1)a,xρ
(1)
a,xTa,x′ ≥ pa−,
where pˆ
(d)
a,x = pa,xp
(d)
a,x/(pa,0p
(d)
a,0 + pa,1p
(d)
a,1) for d ∈ {0, 1}.
Then it can be verified that PrA[¬C] ≤ ǫaM, where the
probability PrA is taken over the randomness in choos-
ing D, T ,L ⊂ A (see e.g. [5]). Suppose now that the
condition C holds. Then we have
naM ≤ na+M ≡ maxM {n
a
M|pa− ≤ 1}.
Also, we can write the best success probability of the
discrimination as
saM = sup
Ta,0,Ta,1:C
{ ∑
x Tr pˆ
(1)
a,xρ
(1)
a,xTa,x∑
x,x′ Tr pˆ
(1)
a,xρ
(1)
a,xTa,x′
}
.
Let z∗ be a random variable induced by a measurement
on ρKa,x. Then, by definition of s
a
M, it follows that
pKa (x|z∗) ≤ pLa (x|z∗)(s0M)n
0
M(s1M)
n1M . (3)
Having considered the M part, we next consider the
L part. Let us first estimate the error rate peL at L from
3peT = n
e
T /nT , the error rate at T . On remembering that
the error probability of the discrimination at M is at
least 1− saM for a basis a, define for a constant δp > 0,
p+L =
nKp
e
T + nCδp − n0M(1 − s0M)− n1M(1− s1M)
nL
,
ǫeT = exp
(− nTD(B1(peT )||B1(peT + δp)).
Then we have PrA[p
e
L > p
+
L ] ≤ µL ≡ ǫM0 + ǫM1 + ǫeT , from
which, it follows that
∑
x,y,z:|x⊕y|>nLp
+
L
pLa (x, y, z) ≤ µL. (4)
Now, let us consider a modified protocol in which Alice
sends ρˆLa¯,x (instead of ρˆ
L
a,x), where a¯ denotes the bit-wise
inversion of binary string a. Let pa˜ be the corresponding
conditional probability in the modified protocol. It then
follows from the monotonicity of the trace distance that
dV (p
T
a (x, y˜, z), p
T
a˜ (x, y˜, z)) ≤ dT (ρ¯La , ρ¯La¯ ), (5)
where ρ¯a =
1
2
∑
x ρˆa,x for a ∈ {0, 1}. We note
that dT (ρ¯
L
a , ρ¯
L
a¯ ) can be bounded as dT (ρ¯
L
a , ρ¯
L
a¯ ) ≤√
1− F (ρ¯0, ρ¯1)2nL . From inequalities (4) and (5), it fol-
lows that∑
x,y,z:|x⊕y|>nLp
+
L
pLa˜ (x, y, z) ≤ µL + dT (ρ¯La , ρ¯La¯ ). (6)
Let us now introduce the POVM {Ma,yz}y,z by writing
pLa (x, y, z) = Tr pˆ
L
a (x)ρˆ
L
a,xMa,yz
with pˆLa (x) =
∏
i∈L pˆ
(0)
ai,xi = 2
−nL , where, for simplic-
ity, we have omitted deviding the right-hand side by∑
y,z Tr ρ¯
L
aMa,yz because it will be canceled when we will
consider the conditional probability pˆLa (x|y˜, z). Now, let
us consider the case where Bob uses the opposite basis a¯
at L and introduce the notation y˜ by writing
pLa (x, y˜, z) = Tr pˆ
L
a (x)ρˆ
L
a,xMa¯,yz.
Note that E0,0 + E0,1 = E1,0 + E1,1, and so p
L
a (x, z) =∑
y p
L
a (x, y, z) =
∑
y p
L
a (x, y˜, z). That is, the probability
distribution pLa (x, z) is independent of the basis used for
the Bob’s measurement. Thus, in the sequel, we will
consider pa(x, y˜, z) rather than pa(x, y, z).
To examine the security of the protocol, it is more
convenient to treat σa,x than ρˆa,x. Thus, define
pˆLa (x, y˜, z) = Tr pˆ
L
a (x)σ
L
a,xMa¯,yz.
The monotonicity of the trace distance gives
dV (p
L
a (x, y˜, z), pˆ
L
a (x, y˜, z)) ≤ νL,
νL ≡
∑
x
pˆLa (x)dT (ρˆ
L
a,x, σ
L
a,x).
(7)
This, together with (6), yields
∑
y,z
Tr(σ¯La¯ − σ¯y˜)Ma¯,yz ≤ µL + νL + dT (ρ¯La , ρ¯La¯ ), (8)
where we have defined
σ¯y˜ =
∑
xL:|x⊕y|≤nLp
+
L
pˆLa (x)σ
L
a¯,x.
Inequality (8) can be seen as a restriction on Eve’s mea-
surement. To take advantage of this restriction, we now
construct a projection on H⊗nL , Py˜, which sufficiently
preserves σ¯y˜ . For this purpose, let us first consider the
problem of quantum hypothesis testing, where two hy-
potheses are, for fixed base a ∈ {0, 1},H0 : ρ = σa,0 ∈ H2
and H1 : ρ = σa,1 ∈ H2. If {Pa,x}x∈{0,1}, defined by
Pa,x = {σa,x − σa,x¯ > 0},
is used as a test for the hypothesis testing, then the suc-
cess probability saL is given by
saL =
1
2
(1 + dT (σa,0, σa,1)).
Suppose now that we receive a product state σLa,x from
the Alice’s source, and estimate xL by applying the above
hypothesis testing to each individual state. Let k be an
integer such that 0 ≤ k ≤ nL. If we allow up to k
errors in the estimation of nL-bit string x
L, then the
error probability ǫP (i.e. the probability that we make
more than k errors) can be bounded as
ǫP ≤
(
2nL − 2
nLh(
k
nL
)
2
√
nL
)
(s0L)
n¯0L(s1L)
n¯1L
(
1− smL
smL
)k
,
where smL = min{s0L, s1L}, n¯aL = nL − naL, and we have
used, for 0 ≤ k ≤ n and 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,
2nh(
k
n
)
2
√
n
≤
k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
qi(1− q)n−i ≤ 2nh( kn ),
with h(p) = −p log p− (1−p) log(1−p) (see e.g. [5]). We
are now in position to construct Py˜ . Let δP =
k
nL
and
p∗ = p+L + δP . Define the projection Py˜ on HL by
Py˜ =
∑
xL:|x⊕y|≤nLp∗
⊗
i∈L
Pa¯i,xi.
Then it can be verified that Tr σ¯y˜(IHL − Py˜) ≤ ǫPTr σ¯y˜,
which shows that Py˜ is a required projection (provided
that 1− smL is sufficiently small).
Having constructed the projection Pa,x, we now bound
the conditional probability pˆLa (x|y˜, z). Since
pˆLa (y˜, z) = Tr σ¯
L
aMy˜z = π¯L ≡ 2−nLTrMy˜z
4with My˜z = Ma¯,yz for short, we now bound pˆ
L
a (x, y˜, z).
It follows, on using TrPy˜ ≤ 2nLh(p∗), that
TrPy˜p
L
a (x)ρ
L
a,xPy˜My˜z ≤ πL,
πL ≡ 2−nL+nLh(p
∗)+n¯0
L
log q0+n¯
1
L
log q1TrMy˜z,
where, for a ∈ {0, 1}, qa = maxx,x′∈{0,1}{Trσa,xPa¯,x′}.
Define now
pˆ′a(x, y˜, z) = Tr(IHL − Py˜)pˆLa (x)σLa,x(IHL − Py˜)My˜z.
Since σ¯La = σ¯
L
a¯ = (σ¯
L
a¯ − σ¯y˜) + σ¯y˜, Py˜ and σ¯y˜ commute,
and
∑
y Tr σ¯y˜ ≤ 2nLh(p
+
L
), we have
∑
x,y,z
pˆ′a(x, y˜, z) =
∑
x,y,z
pˆLa (x, y˜, z)
pˆ′a(x, y˜, z)
pˆLa (x, y˜, z)
≤ ωL,
ωL ≡ µL + νL + dT (ρ¯La , ρ¯La¯ ) + 2nLh(p
+
L
)ǫP .
Hence Markov’s inequality for a constant c > 0 yields
Prpˆa [pˆ
′
a(x, y˜, z) ≤ cωLpˆLa (x, y˜, z)] ≥ 1− c−1,
where c should be determined so that Eve’s mutual infor-
mation about the final key will be minimized. Further,
Schwarz’s inequality gives
TrPy˜ pˆ
L
a (x)σ
L
a,x(IHL − Py˜)Ma,yz ≤ (πLpˆ′a(x, y˜, z))
1
2 .
Therefore it follows that
pˆLa (x, y˜, z) ≤
(
(πL)
1
2 + (pˆ′a(x, y˜, z))
1
2
)2
,
and so
Prpˆa [pˆ
L
a (x|y˜, z) > ΠL] ≤
1
c
, ΠL ≡ πL
π¯L
(
1− (cωL) 12
)2 .
(9)
Now, it follows from inequality (3) that the conditional
Re´nyi entropy RKa (X |y˜L, z) can be bounded as
RKa (X |y˜L, z) ≡ − log
∑
xK
(
pKa (X = x|Y˜ = y˜L, Z = z)
)2
≥ RLa (X |y˜, z) +RMa−,
where RMa− = −
∑
a n
a
M log s
a
M, and a capital letter (say
X) denotes the random variable which samples the cor-
responding small letter (say x). Now, using constraints
(7) and (9), let us derive another constraint of the form
Prpa [R
L
a (X |y˜, z) > RLa−] ≤ ǫL.
If νL = 0, for example, we can take R
L
a− = − logΠL and
ǫL = c
−1. Define
RKE = min
M:na
M
≤na+
M
{RLa− +RMa−},
and let m be an integer such that l ≡ RKE − m > 0.
Choose a function g at random from a universal family
of hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}m. If Alice and
Bob choose s = g(xK) as their secret key, then the Eve’s
expected information about S, given Z and G, satisfies
I(S : Z,G) ≤ nLǫL + 2−l/ ln 2, where we consider Y˜ as
an auxiliary random variable (see [3] for details). Here
we note that RKE is not explicitly dependent on the char-
acteristics of the detector, and hence the detector can
be uncharacterized. Further, as nL → ∞, the terms νL
and dT (ρ¯
L
a , ρ¯
L
a¯ ) approach to 1 unless ρˆa,x = σa,x and
ρ¯La = ρ¯
L
a¯ ; this shows that the leading factors reducing
the key generation rate are the asymmetries of the source
represented by these terms.
To see that our result is consistent with the previous
ones, suppose that the source and detector are perfect.
In this case, we can take ρ
(0)
a,x = σa,x = ρa,x, L = K,
µL = ǫ
e
T , νL = 0, dT (ρ¯
L
a , ρ¯
L
a¯ ) = 0, log qa = −1, δP = 0,
ǫP = 0. Since ωL = ǫ
e
T → 0 as nK → ∞ for fixed
δp, R
K
E/nK approaches to h(p
e
T ) for sufficiently small c
−1
and δp. This is consistent with the results in the previous
works[6, 9, 10, 11][14].
We close this paper with mentioning some extensions
of this work. (i) In the same way as Koashi-Preskill[9],
we can provide a security proof of the BB84 protocol
where the only assumption is that the detector and basis
dependence of the averaged states are characterized. (ii)
It is also of importance to give a security proof of the
B92 protocol[1]. Suppose that the source generates ρ0
with probability p0 and ρ1 with probability p1. Then we
decompose ρa (a ∈ {0, 1}) as ρa = p(0)0 ρ(0)a + p(1)1 ρ(1)a so
that p0p
(0)
0 = p1p
(1)
1 . Again we define ρˆa by introducing
the Grammatrix as above. Note that ρˆa is a pure state on
a 2-dimensional Hilbert space H2. Hence, the terms νL
and dT (ρ¯
L
a , ρ¯
L
a¯ ) automatically vanish in this case, which
could be considered as an advantage of the B92 protocol.
More detailed investigation concerning these extensions
will be the subject of future work.
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